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"[Flederalism as a viable constitutional principle ... is mori-
bund if it is not dead," according to one constitutional scholar.'
Another queries pointedly, "[D]oes federalism exist and does it
matter?"2 He concludes, equally as pointedly, that federalism is a
legal fiction which makes little difference in the way our nation is
governed,3 but "since some lawyers appear to believe in it, we
must, I suppose, concede that it exists."'4 The premise of these
writers, of course, is that the central government has achieved such
an overriding hegemony over the states that the principle of feder-
alism-the federal-state division of power 5-is of little real
importance.
Whatever the merits of this conclusion in other areas of law,
federalism is not so easily dismissed in the area of natural re-
sources. Since 1976, there have been ten significant decisions by
the Supreme Court which have involved federalism principles and
either natural resource or environmental protection issues.6 Of
these ten, four have been resolved in favor of state power and six
against.7 The State of Montana has been an important, albeit un-
* B.A., Montana State University, 1965; J.D., Yale University, 1968; shareholder in the
Bozeman, Montana, firm of Goetz, Madden & Dunn P.C.; lecturer in Political Science at
Montana State University.
1. Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DuKe L.J. 619, 620.
2. Riker, Six Books in Search of a Subject-or Does Federalism Exist and Does It
Matter?, 2 COMP. POLITICS 135 (1969).
3. Id. at 145-56.
4. Id. at 136. See generally Schirber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and
Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 1980 LAW & Soc. REv. 663, 663-69.
5. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTIuTTIoNAL LAW 17 (1978).
6. See infra note 7.
7. Those cases resolved in favor of state power include: Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) (at time of publication, U.S. cite available at 453 U.S. 609
(1981)); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of
Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Those resolved against state power include: New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102
S. Ct. 1096 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
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willing, participant in these developments, as evidenced in Bald-
win v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana" and, most re-
cently, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.9
Paralleling these recent developments in federalism has been a
continuing attempt by the Supreme Court to deal with questions
of Indian sovereignty.10 Natural resource issues have likewise
figured prominently in these disputes, which have ranged from tax-
ation of reservation oil and gas to adjudication and regulation of
reservation waters.11 Because of their unique status as both wards
of the federal government and sovereigns in their own right,"' In-
dian tribes must make use of a hybrid federalism, in which policies
of self-determination are pursued, by virtue of federal policy,
against both the states and the federal government.13
Montana-rich in natural resources and with seven major In-
dian reservations within its borders-has a large stake in the out-
come of these legal struggles, which attempt to delineate the
boundaries of sovereign power. Montana, for example, collected al-
most $34 million in coal severance revenues in fiscal year 1978 and
expected to receive no less than $40 million in fiscal year 1979,
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
8. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
9. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
11. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982) (tribal severance
tax on oil and gas); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1981) (quantification and regulation of Indian reserved water
rights).
12. Compare United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886) with Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
13. It must be noted that while the Constitution restrains congressional power over
the states, there is, of course, no such restraint on Congress in governing tribal affairs. Con-
gress' control over the Indian within the tribal context is plenary, and therefore that rela-
tionship cannot be characterized as true federalism. On the other hand, the inherent, al-
though limited, sovereignty of Indian tribes, recognized by treaty and federal policy, gives
rise to a de facto federalism in which three sovereign entities--the tribes, states and federal
government-must co-exist. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw
122-26 (U.N.M. ed. 1971); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1979) (quoting
in part United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1934) (footnote and citations
omitted):
In every case where a taking of treaty-protected property is alleged, a reviewing.
court must recognize that tribal lands are subject to Congress' power to control
and manage the tribe's affairs. But the court must also be cognizant that "this
power to control and manage [is] not absolute. While extending to all appropriate
measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitations in-
hering in ... a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions."
2
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when the constitutionality of the severance tax was decided."1
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Baldwin recognized that Mon-
tana's elk population is "one of the largest in the United States,"'15
and that the state consistently attracts the highest, or nearly the
highest, number of non-resident hunters each year.16 Similarly,
Montana has a substantial interest in the outcome of natural re-
source issues on and off Indian reservations. At this time, it seems
certain that the Supreme Court will decide whether Montana
tribes must submit to state adjudication of their water rights-a
result with a substantial effect on the state-wide adjudication pro-
cess. 17 Regulation of adjudicated reservation water exists as a sepa-
rate and equally important issue.18 Then there are the conflicts of
taxation authority over reservation deposits of coal, oil and gas."9
Montana, of course, has survived constitutional challenges to
its non-resident hunting license and to its coal severance tax. It
has also prevailed in asserting jurisdiction over the Bighorn
River.2 0 The controversies, however, are ongoing, and additional is-
sues arise as fast as the cases are decided."' The present issue of
the Montana Law Review is devoted largely to these questions of
the exercise of power by competing sovereign entities-states,
tribes and the federal government-in the context of natural re-
source regulation and environmental protection. The timeliness
and pertinence is obvious, and there is no doubt that these ques-
tions will continue to be of critical importance to the Western
states and their citizens.
II.
The principle of federalism is found primarily in the interstate
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The clause
provides that Congress shall have the power "[tlo regulate com-
14. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2966 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 374.
16. Id. at n.9.
17. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 688 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1982) (Montana
tribes' reserved water rights may not be adjudicated in state court pursuant to statewide
program of MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 85-2-211 through -243
(1981)).
18. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), modi-
fied, 665 F.2d 1390 (1982) (state power to tax reservation coal).
20. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Montana v. Johnson, CV-81-26-BU (March 4, 1982) (Bonneville Power
Authority must comply with substantive requirements of Montana's Major Facility Siting
Act (MCA §§ 75-20-101 through -1205 (1981) in regard to powerline construction).
19821
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merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes . ... "22 Recently, the interstate privileges
and immunities clause28 has emerged as an important supplemen-
tal provision relating to federalism. In Hicklin v. Orbeck,2 4 the Su-
preme Court spoke of the "mutually reinforcing relationship be-
tween the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and
the Commerce Clause-a relationship that stems from their com-
mon origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation
and their shared vision of federalism .. . .",5 The commerce
clause has traditionally played a dual role: it is a source of national
power, and coupled with the supremacy clause, it is an inherent
limitation on state power, commonly referred to as "dormant"
commerce clause power. 7 The interstate privileges and immunities
clause, on the other hand, serves solely as a limitation on state
power, essentially in situations where a state attempts to discrimi-
nate against non-residents."
The bulk of recent litigation under the commerce clause falls
under the dormant commerce clause rubric-in other words, what
may a state do in the absence of federal occupation of the field?'9
Where Congress has acted, however, it has been settled, with one
notable exception since the New Deal, that the courts will not re-
strain the exercise of that congressional power. 0 The exception is
National League of Cities v. Usery,31 in which the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 2 could not be ap-
plied to the states. The Court observed that "there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not
be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirm-
ative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
24. 437 U.S. 518 (1977).
25. Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted).
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (source of federal power) with Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(limitation on state power).
27. See generally, Anson and Schenkkan, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 523-26.
29. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982); Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
30. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
31. 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
[Vol. 43
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the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner." s3 The Court's decision in National League of Cities gave
rise to the expectation of a "new federalism," by which the contin-
ued expansion of federal power would be checked.3 4 Like Professor
Lopach in his article, 5 I feel that the significance of National
League of Cities has been overestimated. The test laid down in
that decision is too vague to be of use: the federal government may
not take action that would threaten the states' "separate and inde-
pendent existence"3 6 or impair their "ability to function effectively
within a federal system. '3 7 I feel that National League of Cities is
an aberration, which will be of little value in curbing the extension
of federal power where Congress chooses to act. This conclusion is
borne out by the Court's decision in Hodel v. Virginia Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc.,38 which affirmed the power of Con-
gress, under the commerce clause, to implement the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,11 and rejected the appli-
cation of National League of Cities because the Act did not
regulate the states qua states.40
A menacing recognition of the plenary power of Congress is
found in the concurring opinion of Justice White in Common-
wealth Edison. Justice White reluctantly sided with the majority
to uphold Montana's severance tax, but added, "This is a very
troublesome case for me, and I join the Court's opinion with con-
siderable doubt and with the realization that Montana's levy on
consumers and other states may in the long run prove to be an
intolerable and unacceptable burden on commerce. 41 The Justice,
however, counseled withholding the Court's hand, "at least for
now," recognizing that Congress possesses adequate power to rem-
edy the situation at any time:
Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from in-
tolerable or even undesirable burdens. It is also very much aware
of the nation's energy needs, of the Montana tax and of the trend
33. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
34. See, e.g., Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Hold-
ing-State Immunity From Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 Amiz. ST. L.J. 35 (one of the
many commentaries that sprang up in the wake of the decision).
35. Lopach, The New Federalism of the Supreme Court: Diminished Expectations of
National League of Cities, 43 MoNT. L. REV. 181 (1982).
36. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559, 580 (1911)).
37. Id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
38. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
39. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
40. National League of Cities, 452 U.S. at 283-93.
41. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2964 (White, J., concurring).
1982]
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in the energy-rich states to aggrandize their position and perhaps
lessen the tax burden on their own citizens by imposing unusually
high taxes on mineral extraction.'
Implicit in this concurrence, and in most of the decisions of the
Court dealing with the commerce clause as a source of federal
power, is the recognition that Congress may limit the extent of
state severance taxes if it chooses. National League of Cities not-
withstanding, Montana's coal severance tax faces a difficult time if
Congress chooses to impose a statutory ceiling.
Although the power of Congress is plenary where it chooses to
act, it is quite a different matter where Congress fails to act. In the
absence of congressional action, states stand a good chance of
maintaining their own power to regulate in a particular area. The
test was set forth by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.:"s
[T]he general rule. can be phrased as follows: Where the stat-
ute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inciden-
tal, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits
... . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and whether it could be promoted as well with the lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Just this term, the Supreme Court invalidated a 1913 New
Hampshire statute that prohibits a corporation, which generates
electricity by water power, from transmitting that energy out of
state unless the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission first
approves." The Court observed, "Our cases consistently have held
that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . ..precludes a
State from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right
of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located
within its borders or to the products derived therefrom."'45 There
are exceptions to this general rule. For example, where the state
acts as owner or proprietor, the Court has been very tolerant of
discrimination against non-residents.' 6 Moreover, in Common-
42. Id.
43. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1969) (citation omitted).
44. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982).
45. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
[Vol. 43
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wealth Edison, the court refused to find that Montana's tax dis-
criminates against interstate commerce even though 90 percent of
the coal was shipped to other states under contracts that shift the
tax burden to non-resident utilities, and therefore, to citizens of
other states.'7 In explanation, the Court observed:
But the Montana tax is computed at the same rate regardless of
the final destination of the coal, and there is no suggestion here
that the tax is administered in a manner that departs from this
evenhanded formula. We are not, therefore, confronted here with
the type of differential tax treatment of interstate and intrastate
commerce that the Court has found in other "discrimination"
cases.48
Likewise, the Court was even more tolerant in Baldwin, upholding
a big-game hunting license fee, which appellants charged discrimi-
nated against non-residents and which the district court had found
unjustified by any of the economic bases advanced by the state.""
While diverse factual situations make a reconciliation of these
holdings difficult and probably unproductive, it can be concluded
that states may well continue to enjoy a wide latitude in enacting
legislation dealing with natural resources. However, in the absence
of more precise indicia from the Court, states are left with only a
rough and rather mercurial guideline for enacting natural resource
regulatory legislation: (1) the regulation may not blatantly discrim-
inate against non-residents; (2) the impact of the legislation on in-
terstate commerce may not be severe; and (3) the regulation must
be based on legitimate local purposes.
III.
Commonwealth Edison provides some indication of the leeway
states may have in future dormant commerce clause challenges. In
this case, Commonwealth Edison Co. tried to invoke the "fair
share" theory in attacking the rate of the tax. That is to say, the
utility admitted that a non-resident corporation, engaged in inter-
state commerce and doing business in Montana, could be com-
pelled to pay taxes to Montana, but only its fair share.50 The util-
ity sought to invoke the fourth prong of the test set out in
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,1 that the measure of the tax be
47. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390-91.
50. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
51. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), cited in Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
1982]
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reasonably related to the extent of the contact with the state.
As Mike McGrath and Walter Hellerstein point out in their
article, 2 Montana successfully argued that the Supreme Court is
institutionally ill-suited to decide the rate of the tax. The majority
of the Court agreed: "The simple fact is that the appropriate level
of rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative and not
judicial, resolution."" The majority, however, also addressed the
fourth prong of the Complete Auto test, stating:
The "operating incidence" of the tax ... is on the mining of coal
within Montana. Because it is measured as a percentage of the
value of the coal taken, the Montana tax is in "proper propor-
tion" to appellants' activities within the State and, therefore, to
their "consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections
which the State has afforded" in connection with those activities
54
As Justice Blackmun effectively argues in dissent, this approach
emasculates the true meaning of the Complete Auto test, which is
designed to insure that non-resident persons doing business in a
host state not be forced into an inordinate subsidization of the ser-
vices offered by the host state.5
While Justice Blackmun effectively counters the majority's
treatment of the Complete Auto test, it is interesting to note that
neither the majority opinion nor the dissent addresses the more
fundamental question-this is, whether the Complete Auto test is
even applicable in a natural resources context. The Complete Auto
test was derived to address regular commercial activities conducted
by non-resident corporations in a host state. A different question is
posed when finite natural resources of a host state are involved. In
such cases, the state should be free to use the taxing mechanism to
regulate the pace of development and to accomplish conservation
as long as there is no discrimination against interstate commerce.
For example, it is quite possible that the Montana legislature set
the coal severance tax as high as it did in part because it wanted to
slow the pace of coal development. As long as the coal is marketed
both in-state and out-of-state, as Montana's coal is, there is no rea-
son why Montana should not be able to assess a high severance
tax. If the tax is used, at least in part, to regulate the pace of de-
velopment, both as a conservation device and as a device to even
52. McGrath and Hellerstein, Reflections on Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
43 MoNT. L. REV. 165 (1982).
53. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2959 (footnote and citations omitted).
54. Id. at 2958-59 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 2968-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43
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the socio-economic impacts of development, then the fourth prong
of the Complete Auto test" seems inapplicable. Moreover, a por-
tion of Montana's revenue from the coal severance tax is put in
trust for future generations to buffer the impacts when the coal
runs out. Given that purpose, which seems to be an entirely legiti-
mate local interest, the fair share approach of the Complete Auto
test seems even more inappropriate. 57
In future natural resources cases involving federalism princi-
ples, states are likely to become increasingly sophisticated in ad-
vancing legitimate local interests to justify the impacts on inter-
state commerce. As long as the states can avoid blatant
discrimination against non-residents, and as long as they can carry
enough political clout with Congress to keep the federal govern-
ment from actively legislating, it appears that states will play a
viable role in the control of natural resource development.
56. That test may be summarized as whether the non-residents share of taxes is rea-
sonably related to services rendered. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
57. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390 (some support for this rationale in terms of equal
protection analysis): "The legislative choice was an economic means not unreasonably re-
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